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ABSTRACT 
MEAGAN AYLWARD: The Rise of the Tea Party Movement and Western European 
Right-Wing Populist Parties: A Comparative Analysis 
(Under the direction of Dr. Gary Marks) 
 
 
 
 
In the past two decades, European politics have witnessed the transformation of populist 
radical right parties from the margins to the mainstream.  Many countries in Western 
Europe, such as France and Austria, have strong right-wing populist parties that have 
influenced their national governments by forming governing coalitions and agitating 
political agendas.  Although not a political party, the rise of the Tea Party movement in 
the United States has created a surge of right-wing populism and has taken on many 
commonalities with European right-wing populist party agendas.  Right-wing populist 
parties vary in party makeup and agenda in Western Europe, as do the supporters of the 
Tea Party movement.  Comparatively assessing the party platforms and supporters 
demonstrates the differences and similarities between right-wing populist parties in 
Western Europe and supporters of the Tea Party movement in the United States.  
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Introduction 
 
One of the most significant developments of the past two decades in European 
politics has been the transformation of populist radical right parties from the margins 
of politics to the mainstream.  In Western Europe, countries like Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland have strong right-wing 
populist parties that have influenced their national governments by forming governing 
coalitions and agitating for political agendas, and are shaping their countries’ foreign 
and national security policies.  Populist parties across Europe are enjoying success at 
the polls due to a crisis of confidence in how contemporary politics are being shaped 
by the establishment.  Across most European countries, citizens are facing 
insecurities from terrorism, organized crime, uncontrolled immigration, European 
integration and economic fears about globalization.  Supporters of Western European 
populist parties feel that the current governments in place are not doing enough to 
secure these perceived threats (Liang 2008).   
 Across the Atlantic, the United States has experienced a recent surge of right-
wing populism with the Tea Party movement.  The movement is not a “political 
party” because the movement lacks consensus on who should be national leaders and 
how to organize political power; however recent successes of the Tea Party backed 
candidates in the 2010 mid-term elections portends increasing political solidity (Page 
and Jagoda 2010).  The Tea Party movement is a populist, conservative/libertarian 
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political movement that grew throughout 2009 into a series of local and nationally 
coordinated protests (Rasmussen and Schoen 2010, p. 2). While the movement 
currently lacks political cohesion seen in Western European populist parties, it shares 
many similarities in its origins and political agenda.   
In the past, populism, for the most part, has taken on many different incarnations 
in European and North American politics as both a left-wing and right-wing 
movement.  However, in recent years, right-wing populist parties in Europe and the 
Tea Party movement in the U.S. favor similar causes and policies such as less 
government, stricter immigration policies, and lower taxes. The agenda is framed as a 
movement towards individual liberties or individual freedoms (Armey and Kibbe 
2010). In light of recent events such as the global economic crisis and uncontrolled 
immigration, right-wing populist ideas across the Atlantic are converging in 
similarity.  Although the right-wing populist movement has gained a substantial 
foothold in European politics and has a growing influence in the U.S., the supporters 
of these movements differ in social class.  This paper will outline the Tea Party 
movement agenda and supporters in the U.S. and will compare the supporters and 
agenda of Western European right-wing political parties in France and Austria. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
21st century Populism in America 
 
 Barack Obama, the first African-American president in United States history, 
captivated the imagination of voters during the 2008 elections with messages of hope 
and change.  However, hope and change turned out to have differing meanings for 
many Americans and a new political movement has developed in opposition to the 
perceived changes: the rise of the Tea Party movement and an increase in the strength 
of American right-wing populism (Rasmussen and Schoen 2010).  Right-wing 
politics in the United States has taken many forms since the end of the Cold War.  
Right-wing populist movements often challenge conventional explanations of 
“extremism” because they combine attacks on socially oppressed groups with 
grassroots mass mobilization and distorted forms of anti-elitism based on 
scapegoating (Berlet 2000, p. 1).  However, the new right-wing populist movement 
embodied by the Tea Party is different than populist movements in recent years. The 
Tea Party movement hits a chord of dissonance with mainstream American politics 
that echoes more mainstream right-wing populist movements such as the “silent 
majority” of the Nixon Era or the 1994 Contract with America. As noted by 
Rasmussen and Schoen (2010), the new type of right-wing American populism is a 
rejection of the prevailing economic and social systems and a return to a perceived set 
of values that defined America in the past (p. 53).
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Notwithstanding these differences between the Tea Party and other recent right-
wing populist movements, Kazin states: “populism in the United States remains what 
it has always been: a protest by ordinary people who want the system to live up to its 
stated ideals – fair and honest treatment in the marketplace and a government…in 
favor of the unwealthy masses” (Rasmussen and Schoen 2010, p. 19).  According to 
Rasmussen and Schoen (2010), for the first time in recent history, the majority of 
Americans qualify as populists, most of whom are very dissatisfied with the current 
government.  The perceived detachment of the leadership inside the Washington 
beltway and continuous economic suffering felt in “middle America” are two main 
reasons for the widespread anger, resentment and frustration of the American people 
with their government (in this case supporters of the Tea Party movement) (Zernike 
2010, p. 6).  According to Zernike (2010) Tea Partiers distrust people they regard as 
elites, specifically the Obama administration.  This distrust stems from the Obama 
administrations policies, which the Tea Partiers believe these policies favored the 
poor (Zernike 2010).  Rasmussen and Schoen also believe that many Americans have 
a deep distrust for the elite in government, business and a feeling that the powerful 
are conspiring against ordinary Americans.  There is a strong feeling of loss of 
control, fear about the future of the country and grief that the pursuit of the American 
dream is lost forever (Rasmussen and Schoen 2010, p. 20).   
Rasmussen and Schoen (2010) define two strands of populism: the left and the 
right.  Regardless, populist movements on the right and the left both share a core 
belief that the government is unresponsive and controlled by special interests.  
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Populists tend to agree that the current economic arrangements will not benefit the 
masses and are against the interests of the common person.  Although populists share 
the same beliefs, the ways in which they want to address these issues is completely 
different, hence there are two strands: left-wing and right-wing populism.  According 
to Rasmussen and Schoen (2010), the fundamental difference between the left-wing 
and the right-wing is that right-wing populists believe that government is the 
problem, not the solution, while left-wing populists believe that more government 
intervention is the solution, and weakening the governments power is detrimental to 
solving societal issues (p. 21).  Right-wing populists are opposed to government 
spending, outraged by the large deficit, and believe that government sponsored social 
programs do not work.  Right-wing populists make up a large portion of the Tea Party 
supporters (Rasmussen and Schoen 2010, p. 22).   
Left-wing populists, in general, enjoy a far less distinct identity across the United 
States than the Tea Party movement (Rasmussen and Schoen 2010, p. 22).  Left-wing 
populists believe that greater state involvement in the economy and everyday life is 
the solution to the economic problems of today.  They favor the use of government 
intervention and controls in the economy and other aspects of life where greater 
societal goals can be achieved through such intervention. Although past left-wing 
populist movements such as the Free Silver movement were distinct movements, 
today the left wing populist movement does not have the same distinct identity as a 
movement within the American left-wing with a coherent agenda (Rasmussen and 
Schoen 2010, p. 40). For example, even in more extreme incarnations, left-wing 
populists ideally want to alter American capitalist traditions, which would 
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dramatically increase the amount of government influence and control over financial 
and private sector industries and are generally outside of the mainstream Democratic 
Party (Rasmussen and Schoen 2010, p. 21).    
Despite the differences between right-wing and left-wing populists, the majority 
of Tea Party supporters are right-wing populists and they have been able to mobilize a 
populist movement which reverberates through American politics (Zernike 2010, p. 
1).   The loss of faith in government is not the only reason for the Tea Party 
movement in the United States; the disastrous economic crisis is another factor in 
growth of resentment over government intervention in the economy. One year after 
the 2008 recession, average Americans were still facing harsh economic realities not 
seen in recent memory.  Many Americans were and are experiencing downward 
mobility for the first time and are having a hard time accepting a new lifestyle that 
makes them feel ashamed for not achieving greater upward mobility than the 
generations that came before (Zernike 2010).  The government’s failure to resolve the 
economic crisis has only deepened frustrations with the government and has led to a 
belief within the Tea Party movement that the government is the problem (Rasmussen 
and Schoen 2010, p. 24).    
The loss of faith in the government, the economic crisis and the inability of the 
government to solve the crisis has led to the belief that the American dream is gone 
and that populism is the answer to save it (Zernike 2010, p. 10).  Rasmussen and 
Schoen (2010) argue that Americans once believed the United States was a country 
where everyone has the opportunity to thrive and succeed, where hard work equals 
opportunity, where the powerful submit to the people and where democracy reigns.  
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The Tea Party believes that all of those beliefs and traditions are in jeopardy, 
especially in the context of life for many Americans after the Great Recession 
(Zernike 2010).   
Although there has been increasing coverage of the Tea Party movement in 
traditionally right-wing news outlets such as talk radio and Fox news, much of the 
media and mainstream political elite have portrayed the Tea Party movement in a 
very negative light: comparing it to the Klu Klux Klan, other extremist groups in the 
United States, and underestimating the power and influence of this new wave of 
American populism (Jonsson 2010).  To counter claims of polarization, Rasmussen 
and Schoen (2010) claim that the Tea Party movement isn’t about identifying with a 
political party, the movement is a reaction to the people’s loss of identity as 
Americans and not knowing who to trust in American politics.  From the populist 
paradigm, neither political party is meeting expectations nor recognizing what is best 
for the American people they are representing.  This populist movement is about no 
longer identifying with the political establishment, because the political establishment 
no longer understands them (Rasmussen and Schoen 2010, p. 33).  Consequently, the 
Tea Party frames itself as a non-partisan movement; it isn’t about battling Democrats 
and Republicans, it’s about confronting the insiders in Washington and reclaiming 
power for average middle class Americans. Rasmussen and Schoen (2010) believe 
that if politics continue as is, the populist movement will only grow and “what is on 
the horizon is nothing short of a seismic change in the balance of power in 
America…and a potential political collapse” (p. 34).
  
   
 
 
The Tea Party movement demographics 
 
The Tea Party movement has become one of the most powerful movements in 
recent American political history.  It has become increasingly popular over the last 
few years and has proven the potential to elect senators, governors and congressmen.  
It may even grow strong enough to elect a president, but only time will tell 
(Rasmussen and Schoen 2010, p. 1).  However, the Tea Party movement still feels 
that it has been mocked and disrespected in much of the mainstream media and has 
turned towards new media such as the internet and talk radio to deliver its message 
(Jonsson 2010). Thus, the Tea Party narrative involves growing stronger despite 
being systematically ignored and marginalized by political, academic and media elites 
(Rasmussen and Schoen 2010, p. 1).  However, the narrative of being “outsiders” is 
contrary to the statistics that have been compiled about those who identify with the 
Tea Party movement. 
In mid-April 2010, a Rasmussen Report survey clarified that nearly one quarter of 
the electorate self-identified as being members of the Tea Party movement.  The 
survey pointed out that this number went from 16% of the electorate to 24% in one 
month.  A New York Times/CBS News poll showed that close to one in five 
Americans call themselves supporters of the Tea Party movement (Rasmussen and 
Schoen 2010, p. 2). 
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Despite the connections with Washington groups like Freedom Works and Glenn 
Beck from Fox News Channel, the Tea Party movement claims it is a genuine 
grassroots phenomenon (Zernike 2010).  It is not only America’s most vibrant 
political force at the moment, but a movement that has unprecedented broad-based 
support, and the power to influence the future of American politics in ways that, 
supporters argue, have been misunderstood and underappreciated (Rasmussen and 
Schoen 2010, p. 5).   
Since the initial rallies, the Tea Party movement has been criticized and has been 
compared with former right-wing populist movements in the United States.  
Opponents of the movement have portrayed the movement as being driven by racism, 
bigotry and white supremacy (MacAskill and Pilkington 2010).  Despite the criticism, 
whether accurate or not, the Tea Party supporters have united under the agenda of 
fiscal responsibility, limited government, and deficit reduction (Rasmussen and 
Schoen 2010, p. 10).  According to Armey and Kibbe (2010), authors of the Give us 
Liberty, a Tea Party Manifesto, members of the Tea Party movement are focused on 
defending individual freedoms and economic liberty.  From the Tea Party 
perspective, the majority of Tea Party activists are simply responsible citizens trying 
to defend something very important to them: constitutionally limited government.  
The movement opposes government spending, growth and interference with 
individual freedoms such as gun ownership. 
Even if it lacks the cohesion of a formal political party, the Tea Party movement 
has several “platform planks.”  First and foremost, the Tea Party movement is 
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concerned with recovering a conception of constitutional principles in government, 
which is defined in terms of economic liberty, support of less government size and 
spending, and focus on certain individual rights such as the right to bear arms which 
help to limit the government’s power.  Activists believe that the American nation was 
envisaged in liberty and dedicated to protecting the inalienable rights of life, liberty 
and the pursuit of happiness of the individual, not of collective or special interest 
groups.  Tea Party supporters believe that the larger the government, the more power 
it holds and the more likely it is to interfere with these promised personal liberties and 
freedoms guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.  The Tea Party movement is a reaction 
to perceived intrusions by the federal government and contends that the federal 
government should only exercise powers outlined to it by the Constitution (Armey 
and Kibbe 2010, p. 66-67).  
Secondly, Tea Party activists also oppose government intervention in the 
economy. Specifically, Tea Party activists are referring to the recent bailouts of 
banks, the auto industry and other large businesses.  Tea Partiers value equality of 
opportunity, not equality of outcomes – which reverts back to the rights of the 
individual over the collective.  The Tea Partiers believe that they, along with all other 
U.S. citizens, were responsible for bailing out these institutions that made mistakes 
and did not have to pay their own consequences.  Armey and Kibbe (2010) ironically 
refer to an Austrian economist, Joseph Schumpeter, who notes that “failure is an 
essential part of a functioning market economy”, which he described as “creative 
destruction” (p. 68).  Schumpeter states that “without failure, you cannot have 
innovation…and without innovation, our standard of living stagnates” (Armey and 
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Kibbe 2010, p. 68).  Along with the bailouts that occurred recently, Tea Partiers 
believe that the government is spending too much money.  Another argument is that 
every dollar spent by the government is taken out of the private sector: today’s 
spending is tomorrow’s taxes.  Tea Partiers feel the future of our current outrageous 
debt is knocking at our door and higher taxes degrade our standard of living, leaving 
citizens with fewer options (Armey and Kibbe 2010, p. 69).   
Another driving focus amongst Tea Party activists is that the government is too 
large and invasive.  Tea Party activists believe that big government is driven by two 
audacities: 1) the presumption that people are dumb and don’t know what’s good for 
them, 2) people are corrupt and dishonest; therefore it is incumbent upon the 
government to take money and spend it on citizens’ behalf (Armey and Kibbe 2010, 
p. 71).  On the contrary, Tea Party activists promote the trust and responsibility of 
American citizens.  Tea Partiers are against the Europeanization of the United States, 
seeing that with a European-size government there are higher taxes and a 
corresponding loss of liberty (Armey and Kibbe 2010, p. 71).   
These positions on the economy and size of the government must be viewed in 
light of demographics that comprise the Tea Party movement. The New York 
Times/CBS conducted a survey to decipher who the Tea Party supporters were.  The 
survey, released in April 2010, surveyed 1,580 adults, including 881 self-identified 
Tea Party supporters.  The survey shows that Tea Party supporters are wealthier and 
well educated in comparison to the general public (Montopoli 2010).  The survey 
showed that 18% of Americans who identify themselves as Tea Party supporters tend 
to be Republican, white, male, married and older than 45 (Zernike and Thee-Brenan 
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2010, para 1).  Eighty-nine percent are white and just one percent is black.  The 
majority of supporters are older than 45 with a large group of 29 percent over the age 
of 65 (Montopoli 2010).  
Supporters are more likely to be men with 59 percent and women holding 41 
percent of the movement (Montopoli 2010).  In terms of geography, Tea Party 
supporters span the country fairly evenly but there is dominance in the South with 36 
percent.  Compared with most Americans, they are better educated with 37 percent 
being college graduates compared to 25 percent of Americans overall.  They also 
have a higher household income than most Americans with 56 percent earning more 
than $50,000 a year.  More than half identify as Republicans and a large 41 percent 
identify as Independents, which leaves a very small five percent identifying as 
Democrats. Compared with American adults, Tea Party supporters are more than 
likely to attend religious services weekly with the tally showing 38 percent. More 
than half keep a gun in the household (Montopoli 2010).  Figure 1 and Table 1 show 
the representations and figures of those surveyed by The New York Times/CBS.     
One problem with the survey that may make conclusions difficult to draw is the 
comparison of Tea Party supporters with the general population.  The survey would 
have more substance if it compared Tea Party supporters with other politically 
involved Americans who vote regularly, are highly informed about political affairs 
and have participated in a protest or rally.  Using a survey comparing Tea Party 
supporters and voters who are well informed would be a much better comparison than 
just average Americans, the results would most likely differ than the ones presented 
by Tables 1 and 2.   
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Another survey was conducted by USA Today/Gallup polls that give another 
picture of who makes up the Tea Party movement.  The poll is based on three surveys 
Gallup conducted in March, May and June of 2010.  The survey showed similar 
results as the New York Times/CBS poll, with thirty percent of Americans, on 
average, identifying as Tea Party supporters.  The results are based on telephone 
interviews on a random sample of 3095 adults, aged 18 and older living in the 
continental U.S. (Newport 2010).  According to this poll, there is a significant overlap 
between conservative Republicans and Tea Party supporters.  
This poll suggests that the unified ideological makeup of Tea Party membership 
suggests that the Tea Party movement is a segment of core Republicanism rather than 
a new entity on the political scene (Newport 2010, para 1).  Although the survey may 
indicate overlap at first blush, the Tea Party movement is firm in their beliefs and 
trying to go outside the lines of Democrat and Republican.  Table 2 demonstrates the 
make up of Tea Party supporters in comparison to Americans as a whole.  The poll 
shows that 8 out of 10 Tea Party supporters are Republicans, compared with 44% of 
all national adults (Newport 2010).   
Shifting focus to right-wing populism in Western Europe, this paper will 
concentrate on two right-wing populist parties that have a different constituency, the 
French Front National (FN) and the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ).  These specific 
parties have had growing success in the last two decades but differ in terms of types 
of people who vote and support them.  The paper will then compare and break down 
similarities and differences between American right-wing populism and Western 
European right-wing populism, more specifically with the focus on the Tea Party 
 14 
movement, the Front National and the Austrian Freedom Party and how these parties 
differ in rhetoric, policy and constituency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Populism in Western Europe 
 
In the last two decades European politics has witnessed the emergence of new 
radical right-wing populist parties.  The electoral breakthrough of the French Front 
National in 1984 was the starting point for the rise of parties combining anti-
establishment populism and anti-immigrant politics based on ethno-nationalist 
ideology.  In the 1980s a neo-conservative movement began.  While this movement 
remained an elitist one, the conservative counter-movement to the libertarian left 
gained momentum when the populist right, a relatively new party formation, 
succeeded in framing the question of identity and community in terms of “us” and 
“the other” (Bornschier 2010, p. 2).  Bringing immigration issues and cultural 
differences in the political spectrum paved the way for a second transformation in the 
1990s.  Although radical right-wing parties will be addressed in this paper, the 
populist right does not adhere to racism and advocates an “ethno-pluralist” ideology 
of preserving traditional national cultures (Bornschier 2010, p. 2). Today, right-wing 
populist parties are well represented in national politics in Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, Switzerland and the Netherlands in Western Europe 
(Bornschier 2010).   
These populist parties are similar because they are all movements of exclusion 
(Rydgren 2005).  The party basis surrounds the idea that immigration should be 
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stopped or radically reduced, and immigrants already living in the country should 
assimilate. The second characteristic that defines these right-wing parties is their anti-
establishment populism.  They want to give the power back to the people (Rydgren 
2005, p. viii). 
 While these parties might be labeled movements of exclusion, there is often a fine 
line between racist parties and radical right parties. To differentiate between radical 
right and racist parties based on the opposition to immigration and sending foreigners 
back to their country of origin and the adherence to the ethnic conception of 
nationhood is not easy.  It is difficult to completely differentiate racist parties with 
radical right parties mostly because racist parties have to hide their racist identity due 
to legal or social restraints.  Racist parties tend to avoid reference to racial inequality 
and often defend their policy positions on immigration based on cultural 
incompatibility instead of racial incompatibility (Fennema 2005, p. 9).  Due to factors 
such as colonial racism and new racism it is hard to compare the racist parties of the 
United States, like the Klu Klux Klan, to racist parties in Europe.  Racist parties in the 
United States have a much harder time basing their arguments on a shared historical 
and cultural homogeneity amongst the population because racial and cultural 
differences are inherent in the American experience.  Consequently, it has been less 
sustainable and tenable when parties such as the Know-Nothing Party, the Ku Klux 
Klan of the 1920s, or even the Minuteman Movement today have attempted to focus 
their race-based positions on a notion of American homogeneity (Stern 1997).   
 The radical right in Western Europe encompasses the populist discourse.  Populist 
parties consider the political establishment as incompetent and morally corrupt 
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(Fennema 2005).  Populists tend to believe that the common man is “good” while the 
political elite is naturally selfish and dishonest.  Populists believe that the political 
elite are not out to enrich the common man or the masses, but are purely hiding 
behind democratic establishments to enrich themselves and other elites (Fennema 
2005).   
 Populists in Western Europe contend that they are able to solve the social 
problems they see by introducing more direct democracy (Fennema 2005).  These 
populists believe that the politicians should listen to the common man and meet his or 
her needs that a political elite lacks.  Populist parties blame other political parties in 
power that instead of focusing on the people whom they are representing they are too 
busy fighting with each other to beat out the other parties.  This scapegoat ideology is 
used to show the inefficiency of battling political parties and to help regain focus on 
unity and the people (Fennema 2005). 
 The ethnic competition hypothesis is a useful tool that offers an explanation as to 
why all the sudden voters are attracted to these right-wing populist ideas.  In Europe, 
many radical right populist parties are anti-immigrant parties and therefore it is 
immigration that is the sole cause of the rise of anti-immigrant parties.  Economic 
interests become an important factor to the rise and support of anti-immigrant parties. 
To many, immigrants are seen as competitors in the labor and housing markets.  In 
geographical electoral analysis studies done throughout western European countries 
like France and the Netherlands, it shows on a local, regional and national level that 
there is a high correspondence between the proportion of immigrants and the number 
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of voters supporting the anti-immigrant party or parties of that country (Fennema 
2005, p. 15).   
 The ethnic competition hypothesis shows that in the Low Countries and Germany 
certain social classes were directly affected by immigrants and this social class were 
especially attracted to anti-immigrant parties.  The hypothesis confirmed that the 
lower educated, male, native city dwellers supported and voted for anti-immigrant 
parties (Fennema 2005). 
 Across Western Europe it is difficult to say whether racist opinions dictate the 
support for anti-immigrant parties.  The electoral analysis studies did not find anti-
immigrant party voters to be overly racist or to have racist sentiments.  Racist 
opinions were only found in voter studies in Belgium where it was evident that anti-
immigrant parties attracted racist voters (Fennema 2005, p. 14).  However, Van der 
Brug, Fennema and Tillie (2000) have shown that voters for all radical right parties in 
Europe tend to find the migration issue more important than voters for other parties, 
even though some parties seem to attract more anti-immigration voters than others 
(cited in Fennema 2005, p. 15).   
 Right-wing populist parties are here to stay in Europe and have gained support 
over the last decade.  According to Fennema (2005) when addressing the future of the 
radical right in the 21st century, it depends on the character of these parties and how 
they address the voters and the political scene. Fennema (2005) states that it is likely 
that extreme right parties in countries with a fascist tradition will maintain electoral 
potential due to traditional support for extreme right-wing movements among a large 
number of people in those countries (p. 16).  Countries and regions such as Italy, 
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Flanders, France and Austria have witnessed a flourishing growth in extreme right 
parties and supporters in the last two decades of the 20th century.  The reason for this 
growth in the extreme right is that these parties have avoided the anti-democratic and 
violent legacy of their predecessors.  These neo-fascist parties have become “post-
fascist” parties and then eventually have ended up as right-wing populist parties 
(Fennema 2005, p. 16).   
 Fennema (2005) notes that the immigration issue will continue for many years 
given the large number of political refugees entering the European Union.  How the 
EU decides to handle the immigration issue will play a huge factor in the growth or 
decline of anti-immigrant parties.  Regardless of the status of immigration, even if 
anti-immigrant parties don’t possess enough electoral votes to gain seats in 
parliaments, many right-wing parties have already started incorporating anti-
immigrant issues in their party programs.  Fennema (2005) concludes that of the 
different type of anti-immigrant parties only the Populist Party is likely to survive in 
the coming decades because it has more than just immigration upon which to build a 
broad appeal (p. 18).  Fennema (2005) believes that even those parties who have a 
fascist past will likely void these sentiments and ideologies and present themselves as 
anti-establishment parties while maintaining a strong right-wing stance (p.18).  
Populist anti-immigrant parties will flourish due to permanent foreign migration to 
Europe.  The integration problems that arise from it will lead to the transformations of 
European democracies that have paved the way of more demanding citizens and a 
declining trust in government (Fennema 2005, p. 19).
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  According to Meny, “populism represents a degeneration of our democratic 
systems…it is both the effect and the cause” (Betz 2005, p. 26).  The emergence of 
populism is a reaction to the growing gap between what politics offers and the 
demands of the people.  Meny (cited in Betz 2005, p. 26) states that the success of 
populist parties in recent years is a reflection of the malfunctioning of political 
representation.  Meny (cited in Betz 2005, p. 26) believes that radical right-wing 
parties represent less a threat to democracy than a major challenge to representative 
democracy that needs to be taken seriously.  Like Meny, Betz and others have 
suggested that the increase of right-wing Populist Party supporters has been the result 
of how the populist parties promote themselves.  The populist parties exploit the 
deficits and problems inherent in representative democracies, which have been the 
result of globalization and the crisis of the postwar social welfare state (Betz 2005, p. 
27).  Populist parties have abandoned the traditional right-wing extremist doctrine and 
rhetoric and now are relying on the mobilization strength of populism (Betz 2005).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
The strength of right-wing populism: France and Austria 
According to Bornschier (2010), the continuing presence of right-wing populist 
parties in Western Europe politics since the 1990s is a phenomenon that needs to be 
addressed on a country and regional level.  Since the 1990s, France, Switzerland, 
Austria, Flemish Belgium and Denmark have been ingrained with a strong populist 
right influence.  Although you can group these countries as part of Western Europe, it 
is interesting to focus on this strong right-wing populist movement in all of these 
countries separately, given their very different institutions, party systems and political 
cultures (Bornschier 2010, p. 1).   
 Bornschier (2010) believes that right-wing populist parties almost exclusively 
mobilize on the cultural dimension.  The electoral coalition is made up of united, 
fairly homogenous cultural preferences but diverges in terms of orientations regarding 
state intervention in the economy.  Bornschier (2010) gives an example of the French 
Front National, stating the continued success of right-wing populist parties depends 
on the prevalence of culturally defined group identifications among their voters, not 
economically defined (p. 6).   
 
France 
The French Front National is one of the most successful right-wing populist 
parties and has been a driving force of the transformation of the French party system 
since the electoral breakthrough in 1984.  The French Front National, according to 
 22 
Bornschier (2010), can be seen as the “prototype” or “avant-garde” of right-wing 
populist parties.  This Populist Party has taken up concepts of the French “Nouvelle 
Droite” (New Right) and was one of the first to adopt a “differentialist nativist 
discourse,” as stated by Hans-Georg Betz (Bornschier 2010, p. 93).  The French Front 
National has based their party politics on defending national culture and the 
established traditions that go along with it.  In agreement with Bornschier, the success 
of right-wing populist parties in Western Europe, specifically France in this case, is 
due to the cultural identification and social class influence on economic preferences 
and the support for the right-wing populist party, the French Front National 
(Bornschier 2010, p. 94).   
During the late 1990s the Front National led and dictated by Jean-Marie Le 
Pen, was one of the key players in French politics (Davies 1999).  During the 1997 
legislative elections Le Pen stated, “for two decades the left and the right have 
followed each other in power.  They have said everything and promised everything. 
They have done nothing…I want to give back France her vitality and her power…I 
believe in France” (Davies 1999, p. 1).  The Front National was founded in 1972 by 
Jean-Marie Le Pen and since then the party and its ideologies go hand in hand with 
the founder.  The party was irrelevant during the 1970s but had a breakthrough in 
1984 with the party scoring more than 10 per cent in the European elections.  In 1986 
the party won 35 seats in the Legislative elections and through out the 1990s 
remained an important influence in elections and French politics.  Throughout the 
1980s and 1990s the Front National sees itself as an ostracized political grouping, 
excluded from the French political system and the four dominant parties.  The FN 
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took great strides in rallying against the PS (Parti Socaliste) with “new intolerance” 
which focused and privileged French nationals (Davies 1999, p. 4).   
 The French Front National ideological outlook revolves around two key ideas: 
nation and identity.  The party has great hostility to socialist ‘cosmopolitanism’ and 
out of this has emerged an anti-French racist discourse (Davies 1999).  This negative 
discourse translates to bringing about a strong France, one that can defend itself from 
external dangers like regional autonomism and European federalism; a France that 
upholds its people, its territory and national icons (Davies 1999, p. 66).  The Front 
National has a strong sense of traditionalism with the focus of their national identity 
revolving around work, family and country.  Identity is seen as a very important 
factor entrenched in the French culture. According to Le Pen, former party leader, “to 
take away part of people’s identity is to take away part of their soul…and the 
consequent loss of identity…is a threat to human dignity” (Davies 1999, p. 66).   
 The Front National (FN) sees itself as the “party of France” (Davies 1999, p. 67).  
Le Pen reflects this belief as he stated to parliament, “our movement…is an 
importance to the idea of the nation…the interests of France and the French are of 
premier significance” (Davies 1999, p. 67).  A party activist adds to this belief by 
stating that “we are fighting for the French identity…we are serving France…in the 
case of immigrants, we are not against them as people, but just against the political 
phenomenon” (Davies 1999, p. 67).  Davies (1999) states that FN leaders are 
persuasive and clever about how they portray the French national identity.  FN 
leaders argue that nation is not class-based and that people of all social classes can 
bond and support the French people and nation.  The FN tries to reach out to different 
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constituencies and to persuade these groups that they are vital to the French nation 
(Davies 1999).   
 French nationalism exemplified by the FN aims to be all-inclusive.  It glorifies 
unity and strength by targeting special socio-economic groups and all races, not just 
metropolitan, white French citizens.  Despite their attempts at all-inclusiveness, the 
embodiment of strong nationalism is prone to lead to rhetoric of superiority and 
exclusion (Davies 1999). 
 According to a study done by Bornschier (2010), it is easy to define who supports 
the Front National and how this may define what type of people vote for the populist 
right in Western Europe, or at least France in this case.  Bornschier (2010) points out 
that the electorate that supports the Front National share a distinct ideology but also 
tries to compare this same electorate in socio-structural terms.  Note in Table 3, in the 
1988 and 1995 elections, the self-employed are over-represented among Front 
National voters.  In the 1995 elections there is an alliance of self-employed voters and 
working class voters.  In the 1995 and the 2002 elections, the over-representation 
switches to skilled workers.  In 1995 and 2002 skilled workers are by the far the 
largest group supporting the populist right.  The self-employed workers, who were 
over-represented in late 1980s and early 1990s, are no longer an over-represented 
group by 2002 (Bornschier 2010, p. 121-122).   
 Bornschier (2010) adds education into the equation (see Table 3), which proves 
that higher education is not a factor that contributes to the mobilization of the populist 
right (p. 122).  Citizens with tertiary education are very unlikely to vote for the FN, 
while those with secondary education or vocational training are more likely to support 
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the FN.  Those who have low levels of formal education, Bornschier refers to “little 
more than elementary school” are much more likely to support the populist right.  
Bornschier concludes part of the study by stating that the party’s support base is most 
strongly distinguished by education in socio-structural terms.  What remains 
interesting is the strong reluctance of the socio-cultural specialists to support the 
populist right, even when education is taken into account (Bornschier 2010, p. 123). 
 Bornschier (2010) concludes that varied economic preferences and class do play a 
role in the electorate for the French Front National.  The skilled workers prove to be 
leftist in economic terms while managers and self-employed are more market-liberal.  
What unites these varied economic preferences is what Bornschier calls the “cultural 
dimension” (Bornschier 2010, p. 125).  Class does play a role with the shaping of 
economic preferences but whether voters are actually mobilized based on these 
preferences is another question.  The Front National has succeeded in creating a 
collective identity that has displaced traditional voting preferences and developed a 
homogenous cultural dimension (Bornschier 2010, p. 125).    
 
Austria 
 
 Anton Reinthaller, who had formerly served in the national socialist government 
formed in collaboration with Hitler and Seyss-Inquart after the Anschluss in 1938, 
founded the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) in 1956.  In the beginning the FPÖ had 
liberal and national segments, which often disagreed with each other on strategy and 
policy.  Although the FPÖ was not an extremist party, it attracted many former Nazis 
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with the idea that Austrians should think of themselves as belonging to a greater 
Germany.  The party was formed around strong nationalism, free enterprise and 
against the socialist idea of greater equality among all social classes (Solsten and 
McClave 1994, p. 198).  The principle of individual freedom in society was one of the 
focal points of the party’s program when it originated.  From the 1980s and into the 
1990s, the party focused on developing economic policies that led to tax reduction, 
less state intervention and more privatization.  The 1980s and 1990s were also a 
crucial time for immigration and by 1992 immigration was the second most important 
topic on the political agenda (Meret 2010, p. 190-192).   
 The Austrian Freedom Party has been on the rise since 1986 when Jorg Haider 
became the leader of the FPÖ.  Since the onset of his leadership, the party achieved 
substantial gains in national and provincial elections.  Haider, coming from the 
nationalist wing of the FPÖ, has been criticized for his neo-Nazi rhetoric and has 
shifted the party’s focus to the right.  One of Haider’s goals for Austria was to 
dramatically reduce the number of immigrants allowed living in the country.  He 
argued that immigration was spiraling out of control and creating unwanted problems 
for Austrian citizens in the job and housing markets (Solsten and McClave 1994, p. 
198).  Haider’s campaign against foreigners was a major factor for the passage of the 
1991 law that declared that foreign workers could not make up more than 10 percent 
of the work force (Solsten and McClave 1994, p. 199).  The FPÖ’s rise contributed to 
the tripling of the share of the vote in national elections between 1983 and 1990.  In 
the late 1980s and early 1990s the party drew a lot of its support from the middle 
class, salaried employees, and the self-employed.  More than 60 percent of its voters 
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were under the age of forty-four and well educated. The provinces of Carinthia and 
Salzburg are two of the main support bases of the FPÖ (Solsten and McClave 1994, 
p. 200).   
In the 1999 general election, the FPÖ won 27 percent of the votes, more than any 
other previous election (Meret 2010, p. 17).  On February 4, 2000, the FPÖ became 
the first right-wing populist party to be elected into a coalition government in an EU 
member state.   At that time, the other 14 EU member states took action against the 
Austrian government bilaterally.  This fueled anger and resentment of the EU and was 
successful in constructing a common identity against the EU throughout FPÖ 
members and other Austrian citizens.  The FPÖ was in a coalition government with 
the Christian Social Party (ÖVP) starting in February 2000 and lasting until 
November 24, 2002.  This coalition government then was reestablished in the spring 
of 2003 (Wodak 2005, p. 121-122).   
While in power, the FPÖ struggled with its change from an anti-establishment 
party to a government party. This led to a decrease in internal stability and electoral 
support.  Voters were unhappy with the FPÖ support of neoliberal ÖVP economic 
and tax reforms, which led to a climatic unpopularity (Meret 2010, p. 17-18).  The 
party became divided and resulted in the departure of former party chairmen Jorg 
Haider, current chairman and the entire FPÖ part of the government on April 4, 2005.  
This group founded a new more moderate political party and at the end of April 
Heniz-Christian Strache was elected as new chairman of the FPÖ  (Meret 2010, p. 
185).   
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Despite the division of the party, under Strache, the FPÖ fared much better.  By 
the 2006 general election the FPÖ resorted back to focusing on issues such as anti-
immigration, anti-Islam and euroscepticism, which resulted in the party winning 11 
percent of the vote and 21 seats in parliament.  In the 2008 general election the FPÖ 
won 17.5 percent of the votes (Meret 2010, p. 188).  Until the present day the FPÖ 
remains popular and has maintained a stable support base.  
In contrast with the Front National electorate, the supporters of the Austrian 
Freedom Party make up an entirely different electorate.  According to Kitschelt 
(1995) the common notion that right parties tend to be overly supported by less 
educated small businesspeople and the working class should not apply to the Austrian 
case (p. 178). 
From the 1990 World Values Survey, Kitschelt (1995) notes the views of 
Austrians and FPÖ supporters on political issues.  The findings show that the FPÖ 
electorate is not more racist or xenophobic than the overall Austrian population.  
Statistics show that 8.2 percent of Austrians object to neighbors of a different race 
while FPÖ supporters show only slightly higher with 9.9 percent objecting to 
neighbors of a different race.  A majority of the Austrian population believes 
nationals should have priority in the job market while FPÖ supporters are only 
showing a slightly higher percentage again.  According to the World Values Survey, 
FPÖ supporters are undoubtedly divided between a greater market liberal group who 
are middle of the road on ethnicity and authority and a smaller group with 
exceptionally racist and ethnocentric viewpoints.  The survey also points out that FPÖ 
supporters are less likely to respect authority than the average of all party supporters,
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 and they are less proud of being Austrian.  The tendencies presented by the 1990 
World Values Survey of the FPÖ supporters are very uncharacteristic to other right-
wing populist parties in Western Europe (Kitschelt 1995, p. 187).  FPÖ supporters are 
not over-represented by working class and business-people; on the contrary FPÖ 
supporters are evenly disbursed across the occupational structure.  According to 
Kitschelt (1995) this however shows that the FPÖ has atypical characteristics for 
being a successful right-wing populist party with a broad electoral coalition (p. 190).  
The Austrian Freedom Party supporters tend to be pro-capitalist and have higher 
education compared to other Austrian voters.  There are also more parochial male and 
younger supporters.  FPÖ supporters are distinguished by their preference for free 
markets and a more libertarian lifestyle, as well as being more educated. This differs 
greatly than other Western European right-wing populist parties, like France and the 
Scandinavian countries (note Table 4) (Kitschelt 1995, p. 193).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Comparative Analysis: Tea Party supporters and Western European right-wing 
populist supporters 
 
 Because of unique political realities and cultural factors, American populism has 
historically differed from Western European populism.  Only until recently with the 
emergence and growing support of the Tea Party movement have ideals across the 
Atlantic Ocean converged.  Ideas like opposition to immigration, opposition to 
government involvement in the economy and notions of nationalism drive both the 
Tea Party movement and Western European right-wing populist parties. The French 
Front National and the Austrian Freedom Party illustrate the differences among 
supporters for right-wing populist parties in Western Europe.   In terms of 
demographics, the FN and FPÖ illustrate how two different countries, which are both 
EU members with similar political institutions can still differ in the constituency of 
their respective right-wing populist parties.  
 Comparing the Tea Party movement and its supporters with the Austrian Freedom 
Party and supporters, there are striking similarities between the two.  As stated 
previously, the Tea Party movement is comprised of more educated and wealthier 
American citizens.  Unlike many Western European right-wing populist party 
supporters, such as the Front National, the FPÖ (Austria) supporters are more likely 
to be higher educated and wealthier across the board than other Austrian citizens. For
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Tea Party supporters and FPÖ supporters, the working class is not over-represented, 
which is more common among other Western European right-wing populist parties.   
 In terms of ideologies, the FPÖ and the Tea Party movement also share similar 
desires and goals.  As mentioned before, the Tea Party is motivated by its opposition 
to government growth, spending, taxation, and violation of individual rights such as 
the right to bear arms that views as necessary to limit the scope of government 
through force if necessary (Rasmussen and Schoen 2010, p. 118). Although the 
Austrian Freedom Party program has changed throughout the decades, the original 
ideologies were similar if not the same, as they also call for smaller government, tax 
reduction via new economic policies and more individual freedoms such as freedom 
to express controversial political ideas (Fennema and Maussen 2005, p. 169).   
 As the FPÖ’s focus changed during the 1980s and 1990s due to leadership and 
other social factors, beliefs and ideologies began to differ with what the Tea Party 
movement calls for.  The FPÖ gained substantial momentum in the late 1980s and 
this was due to their anti-establishment focus.  In the 1990s and to the present day, the 
FPÖ has taken an anti-immigrant stance, which has gained a lot of support, as 
immigration has been a relevant topic in the last two decades amongst EU member 
countries (Meret 2010).  Right-wing populist parties in Western Europe all share 
common beliefs about the European Union, integration and immigration, however 
these beliefs do not squarely correspond with the Tea Party platform.  Even so, the 
stances on immigration and European integration closely track Tea Party views on 
federal power and immigration (Rasmussen and Schoen 2010).  The voter make-up 
between Tea Party supporters and FPÖ supporters is very similar and these parties 
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share similar ideologies, despite the fact that the Tea Party has not made immigration 
a top priority on their list of causes.   
 When comparing the Front National to the Tea Party, the activists and supporters 
still share similar beliefs but the makeup of supporters is very different.  As 
mentioned before the Front National voters tend to be working class and skilled 
workers with low levels of education. On the contrary, Tea Party supporters have 
higher levels of education and do not have an over-represented group of skilled 
workers in their support base.  However, the Front National and the Tea Party still 
share similar beliefs and ideologies.  The Front National prides itself on a strong 
sense of tradition, country and identity.  The Tea Party also claims to support 
individual freedoms such as free exercise of religion, the right to bear arms and 
strives to protect its vision of the traditions that the United States of America was 
founded upon; life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.  Even just looking at the 
name of the current American right-wing populist group, the Tea Party evokes a sense 
of national identity and history.  The symbolism of what the Tea Party represents 
evokes the onset of the American Revolution in the 1770s and founding traditions 
that were of importance during the early years of the country.  
Tea Party activists have unique concerns with the future of the country under 
mainstream political control and believe that the idea of the “American dream” is 
gone (Rasmussen and Schoen 2010).  One of the goals of the Tea Party movement is 
to bring back the attributes of the American dream and redirect the country in a 
direction, which they feel is consistent with the founding ideals of the country.  
Comparing the Front National and the Tea Party it is evident to see similar ideologies
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and beliefs based on nationalism and tradition, despite the difference in makeup of the 
voters and supporters. 
 Another interesting point to mention is the comparison of working class to middle 
class.  For instance, comparing the Front National supporters to Tea Party supporters, 
some scholars would say that the Front National has an overwhelming support from 
the working class and that the Tea Party has a majority of support from the middle 
class.  What is interesting about these two groups, working class and middle class, is 
that across countries in the western world, the working class and middle class make 
up the same kinds of people.  The working class often makes people think of those 
who engage in physical labor compared to middle class workers who may work in an 
office of the service industry.  However, many working class jobs earn a higher 
income or the same income as jobs that are considered middle class.  For instance, a 
typical working class brick masons salary in the U.S is $47,000.  Compare it to a 
typically thought of “middle class” job like a teacher’s assistant in the U.S., which 
earns an average of $23,000 salary, there is obviously a difference in income, but also 
a difference in social class (Carpentier 2010).  The difference between working class 
and middle class portrays different images to many people but in reality these people 
earn similar incomes but are treated differently on a social scale.  This point clearly 
denotes that right-wing populism may not be about class at all or the level of income 
earned, but about traditions and who you surround yourself with.  This fact makes the 
difference in class and wages earned much less indicative of major differences 
between the Tea Party movement and the FN. 
 
  
 
 
Conclusion 
The ideas of populism have been around for most of modern history and have a 
long historical line of unsuccessful political stories.  However, since the collapse of 
the Bretton Woods system, the energy crisis in the 1970s and globalization, United 
States and Europe have dealt with changing economic realities, including the most 
recent global economic crisis in 2008 that was a major catalyst for the Tea Party 
movement.  Hans-Georg Betz states it best, with the people having a “general loss of 
confidence in the grand ideologies of modernization” (McMath 2003, p. 7).  The last 
two to three decades have represented a new wave of politics of the people and have 
put the ideals of right-wing populism on the map.  
  The Tea Party movement is the most recent right-wing populist movement in the 
United States.  Thanks to social media via the internet, support and growth has 
expanded beyond anyone’s expectations.  The Tea Party movement thrives on this 
new wave of anti-establishment sentiment and has created a successful political 
stance.  With the recent 2010-midterm elections the Tea Party witnessed success in 
South Carolina, Wisconsin, Kentucky, Kansas and Utah in gubernatorial and 
congressional elections (Srikrishnan et. al 2010).  Although the Tea Party movement 
has seen successes, mixed with some failures too, their goal remains gaining 
increased exposure and relevancy through increased influence in the next presidential 
election. 
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 The FN and FPÖ are representations of the strong influence of right-wing populist 
parties in European politics.  They share similar ideologies and recently have 
maintained a strong anti-immigration stance.  These Western Europe right-wing 
populist parties share similar political goals with the Tea Party movement.  Amongst 
these are less government intervention in the economy and appeals to individual 
freedoms. Despite similar ideologies, the party makeup is substantially different 
between these two countries and this is also represented through other right-wing 
political parties throughout Europe.   
 If anything, comparing the Tea Party supporters with the Front National and the 
FPÖ shows that right-wing populism is not a working class phenomenon, but 
something that is deeply rooted in notions of national tradition, nationalism, and 
notions of individual freedoms and liberties. Notwithstanding class differences 
between the make-up of the Tea Party movement and the FN in France (and for that 
matter, the similarities between the demographics of the Tea Party movement and the 
FPÖ), there are clear similarities in the underlying ideals of the Tea Party movement 
and right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. These include the use of national 
identity and imagery to support an agenda, which opposes government involvement 
in economics, government growth, and focus on certain individual freedoms as a 
rallying point for opposition to the mainstream. 
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